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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the Bank of Japan 
provided the special loans for insolvent banks against the panic of 1927. 
This paper uses a cross-sectional data set consisting of observations on 
1364 ordinary banks. The logit model regression at this paper provides 
each bank’s estimated propensity to close. And the results of the tobit 
model regressions imply that supported banks had higher closure risk 
or occupied key positions in the local loan-markets and that the bank 
bailouts may have reflected political factors to some extent. 
JEL Classification：G21, G28, N25. 
Keywords：lender of last resort; too big to fail; bank bailouts; bank 
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Sudden crises of systemic illiquidity may trigger panics (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; 
Carlson 2005). In a normally functioning interbank market, the surplus liquidity in 
some banks can be transferred to illiquid banks. On the other hand, the panic may 
result in even solvent banks becoming illiquid since they cannot borrow from other 
banks. The lender of last resort (hereafter the LLR) has a role of emergency lending 
to illiquid banks (Bagehot 1873; Miron 1986; Bordo 1990). Since bank managers can 
take additional risks in such a rescue under skewed incentives, the LLR assistance 
is expected to refuse the moral hazard problem (Rochet and Tirole 1996; Goodhart 
and Huang 2005). Insolvent banks are more likely to fail due to depositors’ 
discipline during the panic (Gorton 1985; Calomiris and Mason 2003a). If the LLR 
can target relatively solvent banks, the costs of a partial bailout could be much less 
than that of a system-wide bailout (Calomiris and Mason 2003b). However, the LLR 
may prevent insolvent banks from failing as the optimal choice if the authority 
regards that they occupy key positions in the banking system or if the number of 
bank failures is large (Freixas, et al. 2002; Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007). This 
time-inconsistency of the bank bailout policy is the “too big to fail” doctrine.1 
In the period before the Second World War, the Bank of Japan had the 
transaction relationships with banks, which were influential in the local financial 
markets (Ishii 1980). When the Japan’s banking system faced the depression, the 
Bank of Japan provided liquidity support for those customer banks (Ishii 1980; 
Okazaki 2006a).2 Some argue that such bank bailouts during the period from the 
1910s to the first half of the 1920s caused the moral hazard problems (Fukai 1941; 
Takahashi and Morigaki 1993; Teranishi 1999). Against the panic of 1927, the Bank 
of Japan avoided that bailout policy and organized the screening committee to 
select which banks to rescue (Takahashi and Morigaki 1993). Okazaki (2006a) 
emphasizes that the Bank of Japan bailed out sound banks during the 1920s and 
the 1930s. On the other hand, Ehiro (2000) finds that the Bank of Japan provided 
                                                  
1 For example, Gup (2005) collects historical or cross-country comparisons. 
2 Kasuya (2001) surveys related literature. 
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the special loans for some closed banks against the panic of 1927 even though they 
were insolvent. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the Bank of Japan provided the 
special loans for insolvent banks against the panic of 1927. Using a cross-sectional 
data set consisting of observations on 1364 ordinary banks, this paper uses the 
basic idea of the propensity scoring approach.3 The analysis is conducted on two 
levels. The first examines causes of bank closure during the panic period to 
estimate closure risk. 30 ordinary banks closed during the panic period 15 March 
from 25 April in 1927. The logit model regression provides the estimated propensity 
to close. This paper regards the estimated propensity score as bank closure risk. 
The second level of analysis is the tobit model regressions, which test the statistical 
relationship between bank closure risk and the provision of the special loans. 
The contribution of this paper is to measure the too-big-to-fail doctrine in terms 
both of bank closure risk and of bank importance. Yabushita and Inoue (1993) find 
that financial indices, such as capital ratio (paid-in capital / total assets) or ROE 
(return on equity), can explain bank closure in 1927. Market discipline may have 
worked well. This paper retests causes of bank closure during the panic period and 
measures “to-fail.” To measure “too-big,” this paper also uses both bank-level 
information on the market share and prefecture-level information on votes of the 
election of 1928. Freixas, et al. (2002) interpret the too-big-to-fail doctrine as 
designed to rescue banks which occupy key positions in the banking system rather 
than banks simply with large size. Brown and Dinç (2005) explore regulatory 
interventions in emerging markets in the 1990s and point out that bank failures are 
due to the incentives of politicians. 
The results at this paper imply that the Bank of Japan bailed out banks with 
higher closure risk. These insolvent banks occupied key positions in the local 
loan-markets. The bank of Japan may have rescued borrowers of them rather than 
depositors. And the bailout policy may have reflected political concerns to some 
                                                  
3 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) provide the idea of the propensity scoring approach. 
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extent. Supported banks were too-big-to-fail. 
The first section below summarizes historical background. Then Section 2 
presents information on methodology and data used in this paper. Empirical results 
are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses implications of this work. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
1. Historical Background 
1.1 The Banking System in the 1920s 
As shown in Table 1, real gross value-added of the Japan’s banking sector 
decreased during the period from 1924 to 1928 while real GNP was increasing. The 
banking sector in the 1920s faced serious depression due to the bad-loan problems. 
The value of bad loans which was outstanding in the end of 1926 reached 201 in 
millions yen (54.1% of gross value-added of the banking sector).4 
Three factors caused a large amount of bad loans. First, the Great Earthquake 
of 1923 damaged banks in the urban areas. Second, connected lending caused in 
poor performance of loan portfolios (Kato 1957; Okazaki, et al. 2005). The third 
factor is the moral hazard due to emergency lending by the Bank of Japan 
(Teranishi 1989; Takahashi and Morigaki 1993). 
The Bank Law of 1928 has two main reforms. First, the minimum capital 
requirement was increased substantially. The government regarded that financial 
difficulties in small-sized banks had caused the inefficiency of the banking system 
during the 1920s (Asai 2000). The Bank Law gave banks five years to reach a 
minimum capital level of one million yen.5 Table 2 shows the annual data of the 
number of ordinary banks in the first column and the number of the average size of 
bank capital in the second column. During the 1920s, the number of banks 
decreased sharply, and the average size was increasing. Decreasing of the number 
of banks was caused by bank closure due to bank runs or by the government 
                                                  
4 Using commerce-services deflator estimated by Ohkawa, et al. (1974, Table 31). 
5 A minimum capital level of banks in Tokyo or Osaka was two millions yen. 
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promotion of bank consolidation. 
The second reform is that bank directors were prohibited to engage in other 
business. Director interlocking between banks and firms resulted in most banks 
becoming insolvent (Kato 1957; Okazaki, et al. 2005). The prohibition of bank 
director interlocking aimed to prevent banks from continuing connected lending, 
which caused poor performance of bank portfolios. 
The prudential policy was incomplete before the Bank Law.6 Deposit rate 
regulation did not work well, and entry regulation was less strict (Teranishi 1991). 
The deposit insurance system had no legal foundation until GHQ reforms during 
the second half of the 1940s (Ehiro 2000; Asai 2000). 
 
1.2 The Panic of 1927 
Two waves of bank runs occurred in the spring of 1927. On 14 March, the 
Finance Minister, Kataoka Naoharu, made an ill-advised remark during the debate 
on the bad-loan problem. On the following day, newspapers printed his remark. The 
news triggered the first wave of bank runs. 
The second impact was more serious. While leakage of poor performance of loan 
portfolios triggered the first wave, liquidity concerns triggered the second panic 
(Korenaga, et al. 2001). The Bank of Taiwan, which aimed to develop the Taiwanese 
economy, had also faced to the bad-loans problem due to connected lending. The 
main customer went bankrupt. The interbank markets became confused since most 
of call loans to the Bank of Taiwan were recovered suddenly. 
The Ministry of Finance permitted closure of the Bank of Taiwan on 18 April.7 
This news triggered the second wave of bank runs. Even big five banks, Mitsui, 
                                                  
6 Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) explain the history of the modern financial system in Japan. 
7 The government sought the approval of the Privy Council to obtain an emergency imperial 
order to rescue the Bank of Taiwan. However, on 17 April, the Privy Council refused to sanction 
the order for the sake of resignation of the Cabinet. 
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Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda and Dai-ichi, faced bank runs.8 Jugo bank closed on 
21 April. Since the Ministry of the Imperial Household had the deposit account at 
Jugo bank, The news was also the critical impact (the Bank of Japan 1983).  
The Kenseikai Party Cabinet resigned due to the responsibility for closure of 
the Bank of Taiwan, and the Seiyukai Party Cabinet was organized.9 Takahashi 
Korekiyo, the new Finance Minister, imposed moratorium from 22 April to 12 May 
to prevent the panic from expanding. The Ministry of Finance permitted closure of 
30 ordinary banks during the panic period from 15 March to 25 April. Then the 
panic ended. 
On 8 May, the Bills on the Special Loans by the Bank of Japan passed the Diet. 
The bills have three main points: the special loans were provided with bill discount 
within a year; the Bank of Japan could demand compensation for losses from the 
government within 500 millions yen; and the 10 year term of redemption. The 
average of the interest rate of the special loans was 3% while the discount rate in 
1927 was 5.4% (Bank of Japan 1983). The interest rates of the special loans were 
too low to prevent supported banks from taking additional risks (Takahashi and 
Morigaki 1993). 
As Ishii (1999) explains, the Bank of Japan tended to provide the special loans 
for banks with transactions with the Bank of Japan during the first half of the 
twentieth century. However, the government ordinance allowed banks with no 
record of transactions with the Bank of Japan to be provided the special loans 
(Takahashi and Morigaki 1993). 
Inoue Junnosuke was installed as the governor of the Bank of Japan on 10 
May. He recognized that the special loans against the Great Earthquake of 1923 
had caused some moral hazard issues, and he organized the screening committee to 
                                                  
8 Ishii (2001) finds evidence that the headquarters of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and of 
Dai-ichi in Tokyo faced bank runs. 
9 Nakamura (1988) explains political concerns on the Bank of Taiwan. 
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select banks.10 
The total amount of the special loans reached 762 millions yen. The Bank of 
Japan bailed out 103 ordinary banks, which included 14 closed banks. The total 
amount of the special loans provided for 14 closed banks reached 284 millions yen. 
The government established the Bank Relations and Supervision Department in 
the Bank of Japan to refuse the moral hazard problem. However, some of the special 
loans against the panic of 1927 became the bad-loans of the Bank of Japan 
(Matsuzaki 1928). The Bank of Japan could not collect over 52 millions yen of them 
even in 1952 (Ehiro 2000). 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
2.1 Estimation Methodology 
This paper uses the propensity scoring approach to test whether the Bank of 
Japan provided the special loans for insolvent banks against the panic of 1927. The 
analysis is conducted on two levels; the logit model regression and the tobit model 
regression. First, to estimate bank closure risk, this paper fits the following logit:  
( ) [ ]jiii GdplsFundamentaXCLP ,1 1φ==                             (1). 
Subscript i indicates the i-th bank and subscript j indicates the j-th prefecture. The 
dependent latent variable CLi equals 1 if the bank closed during the panic period 
from 15 March to 25 April, otherwise 0.11 
In the equation (1), the explanatory variable Fundamentalsi indicates bank 
fundamentals. This paper uses three financial indices; Capital-deposit ratio, ROE 
(return on equity), and scale. Capital-deposit ratio is (capital + accumulated fund) / 
(capital + accumulated fund + deposits). This index can imply two aspects. One is 
                                                  
10 Fukai Eigo, who was installed the governor of the Bank of Japan in 1935, reminisced this 
episode in his memoirs (Fukai 1941, pp.215-234). 
11 The probits by Yabushita and Inoue (1993) include the dependent variable, which equals 1 if 
the bank closed in 1927. This paper excludes the cases of bank closure during the ordinary 
period. 
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bank solvency, the ability of paying deposits. The other is the weakness of absorbing 
deposits. If capital-deposit ratio is negative significant, this paper regards that it 
can express an aspect of bank solvency. ROE is measured as profit by capital. The 
probit regression by Yabushita and Inoue (1993) shows that these two financial 
indices can explain bank closure in 1927. Scale is log (capital + accumulated fund + 
deposits). And Gdpj is per capita GDP of the j-th prefecture in which the main office 
of the bank was located. This variable is included to control the local economic 
conditions. And results of the logit (1) provide the estimated propensity, P(CLi 
=1|X)i, which indicates bank closure risk in terms of fundamentals. 
The second level of the analysis is to estimate the following tobit model: 
( )( )ijiijii GdpXCLPEleMsLLR εββββα ++=+++= 4321 1,0max    (2). 
Subscript i indicates the i-th bank and subscript j indicates the j-th prefecture. And 
εi is the error term. 
The censored variable LLRi, which is (the amount of the special loans for the 
i-th Bank) / (capital+fund), denotes the LLR assistance normalized by capital size.12 
The provision and the amount of the special loans were decided after the panic 
ended. 
 Msi denotes the market share of the i-th bank. This paper uses two variables 
as Msi ; Dsi, which is (deposits of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of deposits of 
banks in the j-th prefecture), and Lsi, which is (loans of the i-th bank) / (the total 
amount of loans of banks in the j-th prefecture). 
Elej, is the variable on the Lower House Election of 1928. This variable is 
included to test the relationship between political background and the LLR 
assistance. Since the males over 25 years old could acquire universal suffrage in 
1925, the election of 1928 is the first popular election in the Japanese modern 
history. As the variable Elej, this paper uses Seiyuj or Minj, which were the voting 
percentages of the Seiyukai Party or of the Minseito Party in the j-th prefecture, 
                                                  
12 This paper also regresses the tobit models using the amount of the special loans as the 
censored variable. Results are similar to reports in this paper. 
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respectively. In June of 1927, the Kenseikau Party changed its name into the 
Minseito Party. 
P(CLi =1|X)i, which is the estimated propensity to close, denotes bank closure 
risk. And Gdpj is the control variable as in the logit model (1). 
 
2.2 Data Availability 
The data for capital, deposits and profit are from “the 51st. Annual Report” of 
the Banking Department at the Ministry of Finance at the end of 1926. This paper 
uses log (per capita income tax of each prefecture) as the proxy of Gdpj, per capita 
GDP of each prefecture. The data source of per capita income tax is “the 47th. 
Statistical Yearbook” of the Cabinet Statistical Bureau. The data source of the 
percentage of votes is “the List of the 16th. Lower House election” by the Lower 
House Secretariat. The Bank of Japan (1969, pp.168–529) provides data on closed 
banks, which were permitted by the Ministry of Finance. The number of closed 
ordinary banks is 30. The Bank of Japan (1962) summarizes data for the special 
loans against the panic of 1927. The number of supported bank is 103. While “The 
51st. Annual Report” reveals financial data for 1402 ordinary banks, this paper 
excludes extraordinary observations; some were located in the exceptive region 
(Hokkaido Okinawa, Sakhalin and Taiwan); some had the extraordinary values of 
deposit (0 or nearly 0); and some closed or were merged before 15 March are 
excluded. This paper uses 1364 observations. 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the explanatory variables; means, 
standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values. The minimum value of 
ROE (return on equity) is 0 since the data available from the Ministry of Finance 
archives are censored at zero. That is, even when a bank’s ROE (return on equity) 
was negative, the analysis has only the value 0. The minimum value of Ds, which is 
(deposits in thousands of yen of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of deposits of 
banks in the j-th prefecture), equals 0.000000483. And the minimum value of LLR, 
which is (the special loans for the i-th Bank) / (capital+fund), equals 0.  
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3. Results 
3.1 Bank Closure Risk 
Table 4 reports results of the logit model regression on causes of bank closure 
during the panic period. The estimated coefficient of capital-deposit ratio is negative 
significant. This implies that this index express solvency rather than the weakness of 
the ability of absorbing deposits. The estimated coefficient of ROE (return on equity) 
is also negative significant. Solvency and profitability can explain bank closure. The 
results here are consistent with the probit model regressions by Yabushita and Inoue 
(1993). Uninsured depositors’ discipline worked well during the panic period. 
The estimated coefficient of scale is positive significant. This implies that larger 
banks faced closure risk during the panic. The estimated coefficient of Per capita 
income tax is also positive significant. Teranishi (1999) points out that the panic of 
1927 may have damaged middle-sized and large-sized banks in the urban area. This 
explanation is consistent with the results here.  
Table 5 shows that summary statistics both for CL and for Propensity estimated 
by the logit model in Table 4; means, standard deviations, and minimum and 
maximum values. The mean value of the estimated propensity to close equals that of 
CL. The minimum value of estimated propensity to close is 0.00000000000007, exactly. 
The maximum value of the estimated propensity to close is 0.296. Since the 
propensity scores are from the logit model, they are between 0 and 1. 
 
3.2 The LLR Assistance 
Table 6 reveals the results of the tobit model regressions. Ds is not a significant 
variable. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients of Ls are positive significant 
both in Panel A and in B. The estimated coefficients of Min are positive. And the 
estimated coefficients of Propensity are positive significant both in Panel A and in B 
(20.080 and 19.534, respectively). The results here imply that the Bank of Japan 
provided liquidity support for insolvent banks against the panic of 1927. 
Ehiro (2000) argues that the bailout policy against the panic of 1927 dealt with 
demands of small businesses that were damaged due to bank closure. This 
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argument is consistent with the results at this paper. The Bank of Japan concerned 
bank importance in the local loan-markets. The bailout policy against the panic of 
1927 may have included the aspects of the industrial policy.13 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Political Factors 
As shown in Table 7, this paper tests other tobits using the cross-terms: 
Ls*Propensity in Panel A and Min*Propensity in B, respectively. The cross-term 
Ls*Propensity is not significant. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of 
Min*Propensity is negative significant. This implies that the effect of Min may have 
been substitute to that of Propensity. Is there any relationship between solvency 
and the political background? 
Since the first half of the 1920s, the Seiyukai Party promoted bank 
consolidation in the local financial markets.14 This paper points out that the bank 
with the political back ground of the Seiyukai Party may have been relatively 
solvent. Table 8 reveals the results of the logit model regressions, which show the 
statistical relationship between bank closure and the prefecture-level variables, 
Seiyu and Min. While Min is not significant, Seiyu is negative significant.15  
The bank bailouts policy could include two alternatives: liquidity support or 
promoting bank consolidation. Since the Seiyukai Party could adopt the latter 
resort, the Bank of Japan gave priority in liquidity support to banks with the 
background of the Minseito party. 
 
                                                  
13 Ishii (1999) emphasizes that the special loans by the Bank of Japan promoted not only the 
local economic growth but also income inequality among prefectures. 
14 The Seiyukai Party meaned to prevent large banks in the urban area from acquiring local 
smal-sized banks in rural areas. See Shiratori (2000). 
15 This paper regresses the logit model (1) including politics variables. They are not significant 
while other fundamentals are still significant. 
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4.2 Shouwa Bank 
Inoue Junnosuke, the governor of the Bank of Japan, suggested the 
establishment of a new bank, Shouwa Bank, in order to reorganize some closed 
banks. The establishment of Shouwa bank may have been a model for the 
contemporary bridge banks. It was aimed to prevent sound corporations from losing 
financial support. The headquarters of 4 big banks, Mitusi, Mitsubishi, Yasuda and 
Dai-ichi, held meetings in July and decided to reorganize 6 closed banks into a new 
bank; Nakai, Nakazawa, Hachijushi, Murai, Kuki, and Oumi. 5 banks except Kuki 
were provided the special loans. The interest rate of the special loans for them was 
2% (the Bank of Japan 1969, p.367). It did not include penalty-premium since 
discount rate in 1927 was 5.4% (Bank of Japan 1983). Yamazaki (2000) explains 
that Shouwa bank became solvent during the 1930s. Bailing out these 6 banks 
succeeded in rescuing some sound corporations. The Bank of Japan dealt with 
demands of small businesses of these banks. 
Table 9 shows lists of closed banks, the prefecture where the main office of the 
bank located, closure date and the estimated propensity score. Nakai, Nakazawa, 
Hachijushi, Murai, and Oumi had much higher closure risk while they were 
provided the special loans. Kuki, which was not provided, had lower closure risk. 
Some branches of Nakai Bank was located in Saitama prefecture. Kuki Bank may 
have been suffered form its contagion (the Bank of Japan 1969, p.409). The Bank of 
Japan provided financial support not for a sound bank, Kuki, but for 5 unsound 
banks to organize Shouwa Bank, a bridge bank. 13.4% of the total special loans 
were provided for it. 
 
4.3 Time-Inconsistency of the Bailout Policy 
Okazaki (2006a) emphasizes that, during the interwar period, the Bank of 
Japan bailed out relatively solvent banks. The argument can be still consistent with 
implications of the results at this paper. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) provides 
the theoretical framework on time-inconsistency of bank bailout policies: if the 
number of bank closure is large, the LLR bails out closed banks, whereas if the 
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number of bank closure is small, closed banks are not rescued by the LLR but 
acquired by surviving banks. Since the panic of 1927 was the serious impact, the 
Bank of Japan may have rescued insolvent banks. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper measures the “too big to fail” doctrine against the panic of 1927. The 
results imply that supported banks had higher closure risk or occupied key 
positions in the local loan-markets and that the bank bailouts may have reflected 
political concerns to some extent. The bank of Japan succeeded in targeting to 
rescue insolvent banks against the panic of 1927. 
When the LLR target relatively insolvent banks, the costs of a system-wide 
bailout could be much more than that of a partial bailout. However, the Bank of 
Japan had the ways of reducing the costs. The establishment of a bridge bank, 
Shouwa Bank, may be one of them. And, as Ishii (1980) and Okazaki (2006a) 
explain, the Bank of Japan had the transaction relationships with much of 
supported banks. Okazaki (2006b) points out that such relationships may have 
provided information on supported insolvent banks. The costs of refusing the moral 
hazard problems may have been reduced to some extent after the panic of 1927, or 
under the Bank Law of 1928. Exploring the costs of bank regulation after the panic 
may prove fruitful grounds for further studies. 
 
 14
Table 1 Gross Value Added of the Banking Sector
in Millions of Yen (1934-1936 prices): the 1920s
Real GVA of the
Banking Sector Real GNP
1921 486 12153
1922 416 11831
1923 457 11292
1924 433 11659
1925 390 12332
1926 372 12424
1927 348 12843
1928 345 13673
1929 348 13735
1930 232 13882
Source : Hijikata (1933), Ohkawa, et al. (1974)
year
 
Table 2 The Number of Ordinary Banks and the Average Size
year
The Average Size of Capital
of Ordinary Banks
(in Thousands of  Yen)
1922 1799 1315
1923 1701 1440
1924 1629 1499
1925 1537 1569
1926 1420 1680
1927 1283 1848
1928 1031 2118
1929 881 2467
1930 782 2602
1931 683 2859
Source : Goto (1970)
The Number of
Ordinary Banks
 
 15
Table 3 Summary Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Capital-deposit ratio 0.395 0.194 0.008 0.996
ROE (return on equity) 0.118 0.117 0.000 2.706
Scale 14.350 1.500 10.118 20.520
Per capita income tax 4.990 0.475 4.354 6.144
Ds 0.071 0.326 0.000 6.107
Ls 0.033 0.078 0.000 0.956
Seiyu 0.434 0.105 0.154 0.755
Min 0.420 0.086 0.222 0.728
LLR 0.059 0.407 0.000 7.194
The data set is comprised of 1364 ordinary banks in the end of 1926. Capital-
deposit ratio is (capital + accumulated fund) / (capital + accumulated fund +
deposits) . ROE (return on equity) is measured as profit by capital. Scale is log
(capital + accumulated fund + deposits). Per capita income tax is measured as the
natural log of per capita income tax of each prefecture where the main office was
located. Ds is (deposits of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of deposits of banks in
the j-th prefecture). Ls is (loans of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of laons of
banks in the j-th prefecture). Seiyu or Min denote the voting percentages of the
Seiyukai Party or of the Minseito Party in the Lower House election of 1928,
respectively. And LLR is (the amount of the special loans for the i-th Bank) /
(capital + accumulated fund).
 
Table 4 Results of the Logit Model Regressions: Causes of Bank Closure
Capital-deposit ratio -2.701 0.968 0.005
ROE (return on equity) -10.553 3.314 0.001
Scale 0.249 0.082 0.002
Per capita income tax 0.939 0.330 0.004
Intercept -10.387 2.437 0.000
Log likelihood -126.0
Pseudo R-square 0.126
Wald test (p-value) 41.48 (0.000)
Observed P. 0.022
Observations at CL = 1 30
The data set is comprised of 1364 ordinary banks in the end of 1926. The results of the
logit model regression are shown; estimated coefficients, robust standard errors, and
significant levels (p-values). The dependent variable CL equals 1 if the bank closed
during the panic period from 15 March to 25 April, otherwise 0. Capital-deposit ratio is
(capital + accumulated fund) / (capital + accumulated fund + deposits) . ROE (return on
equity) is measured as profit by capital. Scale is log (capital + accumulated fund +
deposits). And per capita income tax is log (the per capita income tax of the j-th
prefecture in millions yen). Wald test is chi-squares of the Wald test. Observed P. is the
percent of total number of closed banks.
Estimated
coefficient
Robust
standard error
Significant
level
 
Table 5 Summary Statistics for the Estimated Propensity
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
CL 0.022 0.147 0.000 1.000
Propensity 0.022 0.031 0.000 0.296
CL equals 1 if the bank closed during the panic period from 15 March to
25 April, otherwise 0. Propensity is the propensity score estimated by
the logit model regression in Table 4.
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Table 6 Results of the Tobit Model Regressions: the LLR Assistance
Ds -7.089 5.691 0.213
Ls 10.896 5.817 0.061
Seiyu 1.111 1.510 0.462
Min 3.033 1.636 0.064
Propensity 20.080 3.627 0.000
Per capita income tax -0.651 0.338 0.054
Intercept -2.237 2.427 0.357
Log likelihood -419.3
Pseudo R-square 0.083
Observations at LLR > 0 103
Ls 3.765 1.026 0.000
Min 2.289 1.168 0.050
Propensity 19.534 3.571 0.000
Per capita income tax -0.754 0.301 0.013
Intercept -0.891 1.485 0.548
Log likelihood -420.4
Pseudo R-square 0.081
Observations at LLR > 0 103
Estimated
coefficient Standard error
Significant
level
The data set is comprised of 1364 ordinary banks in the end of 1926. The results of the
tobit model regression are shown; estimated coefficients, standard errors, and significant
levels (p-values). The dependent variable LLR is (the amount of the special loans for the
i-th Bank) / (capital+fund). Ds is (deposits of the i-th bank) / (the total amount of deposits
of banks in the j-th prefecture). Seiyu or Min denote the voting percentages of the
Seiyukai Party or of the Minseito Party in the Lower House election of 1928, respectively.
Propensity is the propensity scores estimated in Table 4. Per capita income tax is log (the
per capita income tax of the j-th prefecture in millions yen). Ls is (loans of the i-th bank) /
(the total amount of loans of banks in the j-th prefecture).
Estimated
coefficient Standard error
Significant
level
Panel A: Using All Variables
Panel B: Without Ds and Seiyu
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Table 7 Results of the Tobit Model Regressions: Includng the Cross-Term
Ls 5.648 1.752 0.001
Min 2.027 1.179 0.086
Propensity 22.323 4.196 0.000
Ls*Propensity -48.263 36.122 0.182
Per capita income tax -0.789 0.304 0.010
Intercept -0.677 1.495 0.651
Log likelihood -419.5
Pseudo R-square 0.083
Observations at LD > 1 103
Ls 2.935 1.065 0.006
Min 5.809 1.787 0.001
Propensity 100.062 30.281 0.001
Min*Propensity -173.793 64.294 0.007
Per capita income tax -0.736 0.298 0.014
Intercept -2.541 1.604 0.113
Log likelihood -416.6
Pseudo R-square 0.089
Observations at LD > 1 103
The data set is comprised of 1364 ordinary banks in the end of 1926. The results of the
logit model regression are shown; estimated coefficients, robust standard errors, and
significant levels (p-values). The dependent variable LLR is (the amount of the special
loans for the i-th Bank) / (capital+fund). Ds is (deposits of the i-th bank) / (the total
amount of deposits of banks in the j-th prefecture). Min denotes the percentage of votes
obtained by the Minseito Party in the Lower House election of 1928. Propensity is
estimated by the logit model regression in Table 4. Per capita income tax is log (the per
capita income tax of the j-th prefecture in millions yen). Ls is (loans of the i-th bank) /
(the total amount of loans of banks in the j-th prefecture).
Panel A: Using the Cross-Term Ls*Propensity
Estimated
coefficient Standard error
Significant
level
Panel B: Using the Cross-Term Min*Propensity
Estimated
coefficient Standard error
Significant
level
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Table 8 Bank Closure and Political Concerns
Seiyu -4.452 1.800 0.013
Intercept -1.971 0.717 0.006
Log likelihood -140.8
Pseudo R-square 0.024
Observed P. 0.022
Observations at CL = 1 30
Min -1.280 1.738 0.461
Intercept -3.263 0.738 0.000
Log likelihood -126.0
Pseudo R-square 0.126
Observed P. 0.022
Observations at CL = 1 30
The data set is comprised of 1364 ordinary banks in the end of 1926. The results of the
logit model regression are shown; estimated coefficients, robust standard errors, and
significant levels (p-values). The dependent variable CL equals 1 if the bank closed
during the panic period from 15 March to 25 April, otherwise 0. Propensity is the
propensity scores estimated in Table 4. Seiyu or Min denote the voting percentages of the
Seiyukai Party or of the Minseito Party in the Lower House election of 1928, respectively.
Observed P. is the percent of total number of closed banks.
Panel A: Bank closure and the Seiyukai Party
Panel B: Bank Closure and the Minseito Party
Estimated
coefficient
Robust
standard error
Significant
level
Estimated
coefficient
Robust
standard error
Significant
level
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Table 9 The List of Closed Banks
Bank Name Prefecture Date Propensity Provided Shouwa Bank
Tokyo Watanabe Tokyo 03/15 0.080
Nakai Tokyo 03/19 0.189 Yes Yes
Yamashiro Kyoto 03/22 0.036
Nakazawa Tokyo 03/22 0.114 Yes Yes
Hachijushi Tokyo 03/22 0.146 Yes Yes
Murai Tokyo 03/22 0.212 Yes Yes
Souda Kanagawa 03/22 0.097 Yes
Kuki Saitama 03/22 0.007 Yes
Asanuma Gifu 03/23 0.039
Sousen Kyoto 03/23 0.018
Soeda Fukuoka 03/24 0.014
Toukatsu Chiba 03/31 0.020 Yes
Dai-Rokujugo Hyogo 04/08 0.063 Yes
Kurate Fukuoka 04/13 0.025 Yes
Kurita Shiga 04/15 0.023 Yes
Oumi Osaka 04/18 0.228 Yes Yes
Gamou Shiga 04/19 0.035
Sen'you Osaka 04/19 0.033
Ashina Hiroshima 04/19 0.022
Hiroshima Sangyo Hiroshima 04/20 0.007
Moji Fukuoka 04/20 0.008
Nishi Ehara Okayama 04/20 0.031 Yes
Takeda Waribiki Tokyo 04/21 0.039
Taishou Tokyo 04/21 0.090 Yes
Jugo Tokyo 04/21 0.246 Yes
Akashi Shoukou Hyogo 04/21 0.028
Shikano Yamaguchi 04/23 0.021
Kasen Osaka 04/25 0.068 Yes
Wakasa Fukui 04/25 0.010
Uozumi Hyogo 04/25 0.025
Table shows names of closed banks, the prefecture where the main office of the bank
located, closure date and the estimated propensity scores. Propensity is estimated by the
logit model regressions in Table 4, respectively. If the bank was provided the special
loans by the Bank of Japan, "Yes" is shown in the column "Provided." If the bank
transferred its business to Shouwa Bank, the bridge bank, "Yes" is shown in the column
"Shouwa Bank."
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